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Abstract 11 
Being able to talk about what humans perceive with their senses is one of the 12 
fundamental capacities of language. But how do languages encode perceptual 13 
information? In this paper, we analyze how experiences from different senses (sight, 14 
sound, touch, taste, and smell) are encoded differentially across lexical categories 15 
(nouns, verbs, adjectives) in the English language. Three independently collected 16 
lists of perception-related words show that sound concepts are more prone to being 17 
expressed as verbs. Data from an independent rating study furthermore shows that 18 
nouns rated to strongly relate to motion are also rated to strongly relate to sound, 19 
more so than is the case for color-related nouns. We argue that the association of 20 
verbs with sound is due to sound concepts being inherently more dynamic, motion-21 
related and event-based, in contrast to other sensory perceptions which are 22 
phenomenologically less strongly associated with motion and change. Overall, our 23 
results are the first to show differential encoding of perception-related concepts 24 
across different types of lexical categories. Our analyses of lexical patterns provide 25 
empirical evidence for the interconnection of semantics and grammar. 26 
 27 
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1. Introduction  30 
Humans perceive the world through their senses and then share their perceptions 31 
with others, chiefly through language. Talking about sensory perceptions, such as 32 
whether a curry tastes too spicy or a fish smells rotten, forms a frequent focus of 33 
communicative activity. How people talk about sensory perceptions has been studied 34 
for a long time in linguistics (e.g., Ullmann, 1959 [1957]; Williams, 1976; Viberg, 35 
1983; San Roque et al., 2015), anthropology (e.g., Classen, 1993; Howes, 2003), 36 
and the cognitive sciences (e.g., Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Majid & Burenhult, 37 
2014; Olofsson & Gottfried, 2015; Majid, 2015). A core question in this area of 38 
research is how perceptual meaning is encoded in the lexicon of human languages 39 
(Levinson & Majid, 2014). What words are available to speakers from various 40 
languages to talk about what they see, hear, feel, taste and smell? 41 
Research that looks at how perceptual experience is expressed in language is 42 
theoretically and methodologically heterogeneous, but it is possible to observe that it 43 
has been conducted from two main perspectives. The first perspective takes a 44 
specific lexical category as the starting point. The second one takes sensory 45 
modalities as a starting point. In the lexical category perspective, studies focus on a 46 
given lexical category—often either verbs or adjectives—and observe the interplay 47 
between sensory modalities within that lexical category. For instance, typological 48 
research on verbs of perception has shown that most languages have more verbs for 49 
vision and/or for hearing than for the other modalities; moreover, verbs of vision 50 
and/or hearing may undergo a semantic extension toward the other modalities, while 51 
the reverse happens less frequently (Viberg, 1983, 2001; Evans & Wilkins, 2000; 52 
Maslova, 2004; Vanhove, 2008). As for perceptual adjectives, research has focused 53 
on semantic extensions, particularly highlighting the fact that certain sensory 54 
modalities are more likely to be associated with each other in adjective-noun pairs 55 
than others. For instance, touch-related adjectives are often used to modify hearing-56 
related nouns (e.g., rough: rough voice, rough sound), but it rarely happens that 57 
hearing-related adjectives are used to describe tactile perceptions (Ullmann, 1959 58 
[1957]; Williams, 1976; Shen, 1997; Ronga et al., 2012; Strik Lievers, 2015; Winter, 59 
2016b; Ronga, 2016). The empirical studies of perception verbs and “synesthetic” 60 
adjectives mentioned here are examples of studies that primarily focus on a 61 
particular lexical category or combinations of particular lexical categories (as in 62 
adjective-noun pairs). 63 
The sensory modality perspective focuses on one (or more) sensory modality, 64 
investigating the characteristic way the sensory modality/modalities are encoded in 65 
the vocabularies of human languages. Many such studies concern, for instance, the 66 
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fact that different sensory modalities seem to be linguistically encodable to different 67 
degrees (Levinson & Majid, 2014; Majid & Burenhult, 2014; Olofsson & Gottfried, 68 
2015), both within a single language and across languages/cultures. In English and 69 
other Indo-European languages the expression of visual perceptions can rely on a 70 
particularly rich vocabulary compared to that available for the other senses (Buck, 71 
1949). On the contrary, smell has a very small number of dedicated lexemes: it is 72 
presumed to be the most “ineffable” sense (cf. Levinson & Majid, 2014). While visual 73 
language appears to be dominant not only in Indo-European languages, but also in 74 
all the other languages that have been analyzed so far in the literature, the ranking of 75 
the other senses seems to be more variable cross-linguistically and cross-culturally 76 
(Majid & Burenhult, 2014; San Roque et al., 2015; O’Meara & Majid, 2016). 77 
Both the lexical category and the sensory modality perspectives have been widely 78 
studied. In this paper we explore a third perspective, which has so far received less 79 
attention, and which can be seen as a combination of the other two. We address the 80 
following research question: are there differences among lexical categories in the 81 
expression of concepts pertaining to the various senses? To put it another way: how 82 
many words of a given lexical category are there for a given sensory modality, such 83 
as sight, sound, touch, taste, or smell? That is, do the different sensory modalities 84 
differ in which kinds of words are preferentially used to describe them? For instance, 85 
Strik Lievers (2015: 86-88) observed that, in her English and Italian datasets of 86 
sensory lexemes, adjectives are numerous for touch and few for hearing, while 87 
nouns are abundant for hearing and scarce for touch. Knowing about this 88 
distributional fact of the sensory lexicon may explain, in part, why adjective-to-noun 89 
mappings are more commonly touch-to-sound rather than sound-to-touch, as has 90 
been previously described by researchers working on synesthetic metaphors. In 91 
other words, the directionality observed in metaphorical mappings between sensory 92 
words may be related to an already existing asymmetry in the lexicon (for a similar 93 
idea, see already Ullmann, 1959 [1957]: 283; see also Winter, 2016b: Ch. 8). 94 
This paper investigates the distribution of sensory lexemes across lexical 95 
categories systematically by comparing different datasets of sensory lexemes that 96 
have been built for English in previously published studies. A quantitative analysis 97 
shows that the senses indeed differ with respect to how many verbs, adjectives and 98 
nouns they have. We argue that this asymmetric distribution can be related to the 99 
different properties of prototypical representatives of the various lexical categories on 100 
the one hand, and to phenomenological and perceptual differences between the 101 
senses on the other. That is, we identify differences between the senses that can be 102 
related to semantic differences between lexical categories. 103 
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Reasoning about the motivations that may explain the distribution of sensory 104 
lexemes across lexical categories will hopefully shed new light on the connections 105 
between the characteristics of actual human perception and the linguistic means 106 
used to express it. In addition, the results of this work contribute to explaining the 107 
tendencies that have been observed for synesthetic transfers (Strik Lievers, 2015) 108 
and other meaning extensions, such as the observation that perception verbs 109 
frequently extend their meaning to encompass the other senses (Viberg, 1983; 110 
Evans & Wilkins, 2000; see also Sweetser, 1990). To interpret these proclaimed 111 
results about how the senses differ in language one needs to have an understanding 112 
about what the baseline frequency of sensory words is with respect to particular 113 
lexical categories. Finally, in light of the fact that semantic criteria differentiating 114 
adjectives, nouns and verbs are often not deemed as important compared to 115 
distributional tests (see discussion in Baker & Croft, 2017), our empirical results 116 
provide an important foray into characterizing the semantics of English lexical 117 
categories in a quantitative fashion. In addition to our descriptive and theoretical 118 
contributions to the study of language and perception, and to the study of lexical 119 
categories more generally, we also make a methodological contribution by showing 120 
how existing databases—in particular norm datasets with ratings collected by 121 
humans—can be used for linguistic theorizing in this domain. Many claims that have 122 
been made in the past without quantitative substantiation can now be addressed 123 
using already published databases (see also Winter, 2016a, 2016b). 124 
 125 
2. Background on lexical categories and the senses 126 
2.1. Lexical categories 127 
One of the core properties of language that has received much discussion in formal 128 
linguistics, functional and cognitive linguistics, as well as in typology, is that words in 129 
the lexicon are grouped in what are often called “parts-of-speech” or, with a more or 130 
less overlapping meaning across the literature, “syntactic categories”, “word classes”, 131 
“grammatical classes” and “lexical categories”, the latter being the label used here. 132 
As outlined for instance in Givón (2001: Ch. 2), there are multiple criteria that can be 133 
used to define lexical categories: morphological criteria (which types of affixes attach 134 
to the lexical root), syntactic or distributional criteria (which slots in phrases are 135 
occupied by the word; see Berg, 2000, for discussion), and semantic criteria (the 136 
types of meanings words encode) (see Croft, 1991 and Rauh, 2010 for additional 137 
criteria and a review of theoretical approaches, and Baker & Croft, 2017 and 138 
Himmelmann, 2017 for further references). In addition, there is a whole set of 139 
phonological criteria (Sherman, 1975; Liberman & Prince, 1977; Cassidy & Kelly, 140 
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1991; Kelly, 1988, 1992; Kelly & Bock, 1988; Taylor, 2002; Monaghan et al., 2005; 141 
Hollman, 2013), which distinguish nouns and verbs in a probabilistic fashion. Here, 142 
we focus on the three major categories: nouns, adjectives and verbs, arguably the 143 
three most important major content classes (Baker, 2003). 144 
In English, there are several morphological criteria that help to distinguish the 145 
different word classes from each other. For example, English nouns have plural and 146 
genitive affixes (chairs, chair’s), while words of other lexical categories do not; but 147 
this only holds for some nouns (not for mass nouns as water, for instance). In fact, 148 
morphology cannot be used as a unique defining criterion, and needs to be combined 149 
with syntactic or distributional criteria. Nouns, for instance, may immediately follow a 150 
determiner and/or an adjective (as in a white chair, blue water), while words of other 151 
lexical categories cannot (Aarts & Haegeman, 2006: 118). In connection to the 152 
reduced morphology that characterises the English language, it is moreover not 153 
uncommon that the same word form can be said to belong to different lexical 154 
categories depending on the context it is used in. Compare “I ordered a drink (noun)” 155 
with “I drink (verb) too much coffee” (Ježek, 2016: 101). Of course, the two drink 156 
differ not only in their distribution, but also in their semantics, an issue to which we 157 
return below. 158 
Another formal set of criteria that differentiates nouns from verbs alongside 159 
morphosyntactic criteria are phonological criteria. Numerous studies have shown that 160 
nouns and verbs do, in fact, sound differently. For example, English verbs have a 161 
statistical tendency to end in final voiced stops (Taylor, 2002; Monaghan et al., 2005; 162 
Hollman, 2013). Hollman (2013) found that when participants generate nonce verbs 163 
and nouns, the nonce verbs had more final obstruents than the nonce nouns. Lexical 164 
stress is an important cue to the noun/verb distinction in English (Liberman & Prince, 165 
1977; Kelly, 1988, 1992; Kelly & Bock, 1988), with disyllabic nouns having initial 166 
stress, as opposed to disyllabic verbs, on which the second syllable tends to be 167 
stressed (see also Sherman, 1975). Nouns also have on average more syllables than 168 
verbs (Cassidy & Kelly, 1991). These studies show that phonological patterns help to 169 
differentiate nouns and verbs on top of morphosyntactic patterns. The phonological 170 
patterns are, crucially, probabilistic: a verb, for example, may well not have a final 171 
voiced stop and still be a verb—but verbs are statistically more likely than nouns to 172 
exhibit this pattern (see Kelly, 1992; Monaghan et al., 2005, 2007; Farmer et al., 173 
2006). The degree to which a noun or a verb fits the phonological patterns observed 174 
for its lexical category is best seen as a prototype category, with some more 175 
prototypical nouns and verbs and some less prototypical nouns and verbs. In the 176 
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case of sound patterns, this prototypicality is determined by how many phonological 177 
features of the lexical category apply to a given word (Monaghan et al., 2005). 178 
The same way that we cannot reason about the sound patterns of nouns and 179 
verbs in terms of crisp categorical distinctions, the same way we cannot reason 180 
about the semantics of nouns, verbs and other lexical categories (Lyons, 1977: Ch. 181 
11) in an absolute fashion. It is widely agreed that “one cannot simply look at the part 182 
of speech of a word in order to know its semantic type” (Murphy, 2010: 144). That is, 183 
semantic criteria for what makes a verb a verb and a noun a noun are not sufficient 184 
to classify all words according to lexical category (but see discussion in Gärdenfors, 185 
2014: Ch. 6-11). For example, the noun running describes an action, whereas the 186 
verb to know describes a state, showing that we cannot use the semantic distinction 187 
between actions and states as a hard rule to distinguish nouns and verbs. However, 188 
even though lexical categories are reliably defined morphologically and 189 
distributionally (and to some extent also phonologically), different lexical categories 190 
also have semantic prototypes, which correspond to the ontological categories THING, 191 
ACTION and PROPERTY (Murphy, 2010: Ch. 7; see also Frawley, 1992: Ch. 3-4). 192 
Murphy (2010: 144) states that: “[t]ypical nouns describe INDIVIDUAL PHYSICAL 193 
OBJECTS, typical verbs describe PHYSICAL ACTIONS, and typical adjectives designate 194 
PROPERTIES.” As expected given the probabilistic nature of semantic patterns in 195 
lexical categories, examples that do not conform to these prototypes abound, such 196 
as nouns that do not denote things (e.g., oblivion, unconventionality, examination), 197 
verbs that do not denote actions (e.g., to know, to be) or adjectives that do not 198 
denote properties (e.g., corporate in corporate tax). Murphy (2010: 140) goes on to 199 
make the following statements with respect to the prototypes of nouns, verbs and 200 
adjectives: 201 
 202 
• “The central members of the NOUN category designate types of PHYSICAL 203 
OBJECTS, and PHYSICAL OBJECTS are most typically designated by nouns.” 204 
• “The central members of the VERB category designate types of ACTIONS, and 205 
ACTIONS are most typically designated by verbs.” 206 
• “The central members of the ADJECTIVE category designate types of 207 
PROPERTIES, and PROPERTIES are most typically designated by adjectives.” 208 
 209 
Givón (2001), and following him Murphy (2010), lists several criteria for each of 210 
the major lexical categories (see also Frawley, 1992). Similar to Monaghan et al. 211 
(2005)’s prototypicality measure for phonological features of nouns and verbs, a word 212 
can also be a more or less prototypical member of a lexical category depending on 213 
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how many criteria it satisfies. Prototype categories are inherently probabilistic, there 214 
are no hard cut-off criteria but fuzzy boundaries (this differs starkly from the treatment 215 
of lexical categories in formal grammars). 216 
Even only with respect to semantic criteria, Givón (2001: Ch. 2) lists multiple 217 
dimensions as well, including temporal stability, complexity, compactness, 218 
countability, agentiveness and spatial diffuseness. Of these, Givón (2001) considers 219 
temporal stability the most important one (see p. 50). Compared to adjectives and in 220 
particular to verbs, “[t]he prototype of the class noun occupies the most time-stable 221 
end of the scale” (Givón, 2001: 51). As Murphy (2010: 141) states, “[y]ou can be 222 
fairly sure that something that is called a table will still be a table (and not a goose or 223 
a song) from one moment to another”. Time-stability is not an all-or-nothing property 224 
— there is a continuum from very stable to very unstable (Murphy, 2010: 141; Givón, 225 
1984: 55), so there are gradations of time-stability within the noun category, and for 226 
the verb and adjective categories as well. Givón (2001: 51) gives the following 227 
examples from the nominal domain: 228 
 229 
“If it is a chair now, it is still likely to be a chair in five minutes, an hour, or a day — 230 
in size, shape, color, texture, consistency or usage. Of course, a fine internal 231 
gradation still exists, so that a child may change faster than a tree, and that faster 232 
than a house, and that faster than a rock, etc.”  233 
 234 
In contrast to most nouns, prototypical verbs “are not so time-stable — they tend 235 
to represent that which is temporary and changing”, for example, we do not expect a 236 
‘singing’ event to last forever (ibid. 141). The idea of nouns and verbs differing with 237 
respect to the dimension of time is already found in Aristotle’s distinction between 238 
onoma and rhēma: “By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which 239 
has no reference to time” (De Int. 16a, 19-21); and “A verb is that which, in addition 240 
to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time” (De Int. 16b, 6-9) (from 241 
Blevins, 2012: 377). In Langacker’s term, verbs realize the conceptual schema called 242 
“process”, which describes “a complex relationship that develops through conceived 243 
time” (Langacker, 2008: 112). 244 
Adjectives rank in between verbs and nouns with respect to time-stability. They 245 
express concepts that are less stable in terms of their temporal profile than concepts 246 
expressed by nouns because they can refer to properties of objects that can change, 247 
as well as to properties that may not change. And adjectives express more time-248 
stable concepts than verbs, since they frequently refer to concepts that do not involve 249 
rapid changes—e.g., a green apple changes color only slowly, and some objects, 250 
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such as rocks, do not change color at all, unless painted. This renders adjectives 251 
such as blue or yellow relatively more time-stable than prototypical verbs such as run 252 
and throw. However, again, there are gradations within the adjective category. For 253 
example, color adjectives such as blue or yellow describe relatively more time-stable 254 
properties than adjectives describing emotional states such as happy or sad, which 255 
describe properties that can change very rapidly. The issue that adjectives can be 256 
both stable or instable in terms of their temporal profiles is also explored in the formal 257 
literature, which has discussed at great length the difference between individual-level 258 
predicative adjectives (associated with temporal persistence) and stage-level 259 
predicative adjectives (associated with bounded states) (see e.g., Marín, 2010). 260 
Whereas in the formal literature this distinction is seen as hard-cut, time-stability is 261 
conceived of as a graded notion in cognitive semantics approaches, with variation 262 
within lexical categories. 263 
Another way to think about these semantic prototypes for nouns, verbs and 264 
adjectives is to think from the perspective of lexical differentiation, in line with what 265 
has been said about the codability of certain semantic domains (compare Levinson & 266 
Majid, 2014): we may think of the semantic domain of actions (and more generally 267 
events) as being more differentiated in the verbal category than in the noun category. 268 
This view is expressed by Frawley (1992: 68) who says about nouns that they “may 269 
not always be persons, places, or things, but persons, places, and things almost 270 
always turn out to be nouns”. He similarly says that “[n]ot all verbs are actions, but 271 
when actions are expressed, they overwhelmingly tend to surface as verbs” (ibid. 272 
141). According to this proposal (which so far has not been tested quantitatively), for 273 
action-related and event-related concepts there should be more verbs than nouns 274 
and adjectives. The semantic domain of properties on the other hand should be more 275 
differentiated within the adjective category, with (relatively) more adjectives denoting 276 
properties, compared to nouns and verbs. Similarly, the semantic domain of objects 277 
should be most differentiated within the nominal domain. 278 
 279 
2.2. Lexical categories and the senses 280 
Based on these ideas, we can make explicit predictions with respect to the lexical 281 
differentiation of sensory words. In particular, the relatively more “dynamic” sensory 282 
modalities, i.e. those that are more event-oriented and time-varying, should be more 283 
differentiated within the verbal domain because verbs, according to the positions 284 
outlined above (Frawley, 1992; Givón, 2001; Langacker, 2008; Murphy, 2010; 285 
Gärdenfors, 2014), should load heavily onto those semantic domains that involve 286 
transient phenomena such as actions, events and movements. 287 
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We propose that the sensory modality of sound (audition) is a prime candidate for 288 
a perceptual quality that is inherently dynamic. Auditory experience involves a strong 289 
component of “spatio-temporal dynamism” (O’Shaughnessy 2009: 117; see also 290 
O’Callaghan, 2007, 2009, 2014 and references therein), arguably stronger than that 291 
involved in visual, gustatory, olfactory and tactile experience. There are two aspects 292 
of the idea that sound is comparatively more dynamic. First, motion is necessarily 293 
involved in sound production, which in many cases results from deliberate actions, 294 
and sound production itself is an event that unfolds over time. Second, the sounds 295 
we frequently hear are generally transient and if they are not, they involve internal 296 
variation such as changes in frequency. Even a “static” frequency of, say, 440Hz, is 297 
something that can only be perceived by hearing multiple pulses and integrating 298 
them over time. That is, time is an inherent feature of sound in both production and 299 
perception. As stated by Matthen (2010: 79-80), “audition presents its objects as 300 
temporally composed”. 301 
Regarding the action and movement components of sound, consider that a rock 302 
by itself does not make noise. But throw a rock and it makes a clonking sound; 303 
scratch along its surface and you get a screeching sound; crack the rock and it 304 
makes a cracking sound. That is, any action performed on the rock creates sound. 305 
The rock itself is static and soundless, but once subject to movement, sound waves 306 
are created (“[t]he generation of sound always originates in mechanical vibration”, 307 
Hartmann, 1995: 1). We may associate movement of the rock with sound both 308 
through our own action (such as throwing the rock), or through external or inanimate 309 
action, such as when a rock falls down a cliff because of wind. This is nicely 310 
expressed in the following quote from Aristotle’s De Anima (book II Ch. 8, 419b9, 311 
transl. by D. W. Hamlyn 1968): 312 
 313 
“Actual sound is always of something in relation to something and in something; 314 
for it is a blow which produces it. For this reason it is impossible for there to be 315 
sound when there is only one thing; for the striker and the thing struck are 316 
different. Hence the thing which makes the sound does so in relation to 317 
something; and a blow cannot occur without movement.” 318 
 319 
O’Callaghan (2009: 28) also states that “sounds are particular events of a certain 320 
kind. They are events in which a moving object disturbs a surrounding medium and 321 
sets it moving”. Philosophers have extensively discussed the perceptual nature of 322 
sound (O’Callaghan, 2014). According to the event-based view of auditory objects of 323 
perception, sounds are events that occupy time (in sequence), in contrast to objects 324 
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(and their properties) which may exist wholly at a particular moment in time 325 
(O’Callaghan, 2007, 2008, 2009; Matthen, 2010). O’Callaghan (2008: 804) describes 326 
sounds as being different from “ordinary tables and chairs – you cannot grasp or 327 
trace a sound – and sounds are not heard to be properties or qualities of tables and 328 
chairs, since sounds do not seem bound to ordinary objects in the way that their 329 
colors, shapes, and textures do”. Even philosophers who contend that sounds are 330 
stable dispositions of objects (to vibrate in a certain way in response to the right kind 331 
of mechanical stimulation) acknowledge a crucial component of movement in order to 332 
make the sounds that an object is disposed to create audible: “We only hear sounds 333 
when objects are stimulated to vibrate and thus produce pressure waves in the 334 
ambient air. Without stimulation, or without air, you can't hear objects” (Kulvicki, 335 
2015: 207). 336 
As an example where the connection between sound production and action is felt 337 
particularly strongly in our everyday phenomenology, consider speech. Vocal 338 
production involves movement, such as movement of the diaphragm and the lungs to 339 
generate air flow; movement of the vocal folds to generate voiced sounds and pitch; 340 
as well as movements of the tongue and the jaw, often accompanied by external 341 
bodily movements such as head movements to index prosody or gestures. Another 342 
example of the inherent sound/motion connection is gait. We are used to our own 343 
movements generating sounds while walking. 344 
Of course, the overlap between movement in our everyday environment and 345 
sound is not perfect, at least not when seen from the perspective of our auditory 346 
phenomenology. Although sound necessarily involves motion in its production, we do 347 
not always witness the motion as such. As stated by Pasnau (2000: 34), “one can 348 
perceive motion without perceiving sound; (...) one can perceive sound without 349 
perceiving motion”. Examples of this include seeing movement at a distance, too far 350 
away for any sounds to be audible (as often happens with airplanes in the sky), or 351 
seeing small insects fly around whose movements are simply too quiet to be audible. 352 
Listening to music through ear plugs with one’s eyes closed is another example of 353 
movement and sound being decoupled in our environments. In the case of ear plugs, 354 
there still is movement involved (the vibrations of the sound-emitting device), but we 355 
are not phenomenologically aware of these movements. While all movement 356 
generates sound and all sound is generated by movement, not all sound and sound-357 
generating movement is available to our phenomenology. That said, since sounds 358 
necessarily involve movement in their production and since any physical action 359 
necessarily produces some sound, the correlation between sound and movement is 360 
particularly strong. This correlation is much weaker for all of the other senses. A 361 
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flower, for example, does not have to move in order to make the percepts ‘red’ or 362 
‘fragrant’ available to the perceiver; these percepts are accessible without movement.  363 
The other side to the notion that sound is inherently more dynamic is its transient 364 
nature (cf. O’Callaghan & Nudds 2009 and Nudds 2015 for recent philosophical 365 
perspectives on the essential temporality of sound). As said by O’Callaghan (2007: 366 
22), a sound “has a beginning, a middle, and an end”. As a result of this, we expect 367 
sounds to not last forever, such as the events described by words like squealing, 368 
beeping, barking and clonking. Even when we use seemingly more time-stable 369 
auditory adjectives, such as loud and quiet, these terms are either bound to a 370 
transient sound (a loud beep) or can possibly change state (a quiet classroom). This 371 
is different from, for example, color terms, which describe relatively more stable 372 
properties of entities1. A gray rock will generally change color less quickly than a 373 
quiet classroom will change quietness. Sound adjectives have a fundamentally 374 
different flavor, compared to adjectives of the other senses. For sensory perception 375 
one can see, feel, taste or smell, adjectives actually denote properties. In the case of 376 
sensory perceptions we hear, adjectives denote events, and these events are often 377 
connected with actions (such as squealing, which suggests an animate producer). 378 
Even if sound is not dynamic in terms of transience of the entire sound (on/off), then 379 
it is still characterized by internal variation and by a recognizable internal structure 380 
that is temporally defined. Even relatively stable sounds created by inanimate things, 381 
such as the sound of the ocean, involve internal temporal patterns—in fact, the 382 
notion of perceiving a sound of a certain frequency involves continuous variation in 383 
sound waves. Without frequency pulses or some form of rhythmic cycle, we would 384 
not be able to hear a sound of a certain frequency. 385 
Thus, sound is two-fold dynamic: it involves actions and movements in its 386 
production, and it is dynamic in perception as well, by virtue of being transient and 387 
characterized by internal change. This dynamicity is largely accessible to our 388 
phenomenology, that is, we are or can become aware of it. Based on this and based 389 
on Givón’s notion of time-stability, we can form the prediction that sound concepts 390 
should be relatively more differentiated in the verbal domain. That is, compared to 391 
the other senses, sounds should be more verby in their linguistic patterning.  392 
We can formulate an additional prediction with respect to the modality of touch. It 393 
too is very dynamic (see Popova, 2005), but in a different way from sound. Here, we 394 
have to differentiate between the perception of surface texture as opposed to such 395 
                                                
1 As commented by one reviewer, adjectives like loud and quiet can also be distinguished from 
adjectives like gray in terms scalarity (locationality vs. configurationality, cf. Popova 2005). In the 
present discussion we are however concerned with the temporal dimension. 
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touch-related properties as temperature. Whereas it is possible to perceive heat or 396 
coldness by touching an object statically (such as holding one’s finger on a stove), 397 
the perception of such surface properties as roughness, smoothness, hardness, or 398 
softness, is very limited without moving one’s hand along a surface. Carlson (2010: 399 
248) mentions that “[u]nless the skin is moving, tactile sensation provides little 400 
information about the nature of objects we touch”, and Bartley (1953: 401) says that 401 
“tactile exploration is a piecemeal affair”. This also relates to the distinction between 402 
active and passive touch (Katz, 1989 [1925]): “In one case the impression on the skin 403 
is brought about by the perceiver himself and in the other case by some outside 404 
agency […] Active touch is an exploratory rather than a merely receptive sense. 405 
When a person touches something with his fingers he produces the stimulation as it 406 
were. More exactly, variations in skin stimulation are caused by variation in his motor 407 
activity” (Gibson, 1962: 477). As Popova (2005: 401) points out, “because of the 408 
hand’s function in active touch, the tactile sense is a unique modality in which 409 
stimulation is obtained rather than imposed by the stimulus”. 410 
The same goes for the perception of shapes via touch. Imagine perceiving the 411 
shape of a walking stick. Vision makes the shape percept available to one’s 412 
consciousness at an instant (see Stokes & Biggs, 2015). In contrast, perceiving the 413 
same shape via touch (without sight) involves moving one’s hand along the stick and 414 
only after having haptically explored the stick for a long time does the full shape 415 
become apparent. However, while the perception of surface texture and shape via 416 
touch in the absence of vision necessarily involves movement and action, touch may 417 
also be slightly less dynamic than sound, or dynamic in a different way. Above we 418 
argued that the dynamicity of sound is a two-fold idea, one aspect being the 419 
movement dimension involved in sound production, the other one being transience. 420 
The action-component also ascribes to (active) touch, which involves haptic 421 
exploration and hence movement. However, an important difference here is that 422 
sound is dynamic the way sounds are produced and perceived, whereas touch is 423 
dynamic only with respect to the way humans perceive. The surface properties and 424 
shapes themselves are not the outcome of dynamic events the same way they are 425 
for sound. In fact, surface properties are generally more stable properties of objects. 426 
For example, a rough rock generally stays a rough rock the same way that its color 427 
stays the same. Thus, touch may not be as dynamic as sound. 428 
Of course, it is trivially true that all sensory perception has an element of 429 
dynamicity. All of cognition and perception takes time (Spivey, 2007), even the 430 
perception of color, tastes or smells. However, what we talk about here in terms of 431 
dynamicity is not so much just the phenomenological characteristic of an individual 432 
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sensory impression slowly unfolding in time, but also the immediate association of 433 
particular perceptions with actions and movements, as well as with rapid change and 434 
sequential temporal structure. Moreover, it is also trivially true that all perceptions 435 
necessarily involve some form of movement, such as the decomposition of chemicals 436 
in the case of taste and the movement of light photons in the case of vision. 437 
However, the issue is whether the motion is actually perceptible. Huumo (2010: 59) 438 
(see also Talmy, 2000: 112) notes that the dynamic component of sound (and to 439 
some extent, according to him, smell) is perceptible, compared to the motion of light, 440 
which is phenomenologically inaccessible and hence appears immediate and static. 441 
In line with the phenomenological accessibility of the dynamic nature of sound, 442 
Pasnau (2000: 31), in his review of historical philosophical positions of sound notes 443 
that “it was obvious to the medievals that sound is closely connected with motion, 444 
perhaps identical to a certain kind of motion”. He furthermore notes that it took 445 
sophisticated technologies to uncover that sensible properties such as color and heat 446 
involve motion, “the same can be seen in the case of sound through intelligent 447 
observation” (ibid. 31), such as when seeing objects or water vibrate as a result of 448 
loud noises, or such as when feeling a direct blow through particularly loud noises. 449 
As a point in comparison, consider the fact that taste and smell may be temporally 450 
variable as well: one may slowly become aware of a taste sensation, which grows 451 
stronger in one’s mouth and ultimately fades away, or one may notice a smell slowly 452 
unfolding in a room (cf. discussion in Huumo, 2010). However, both of these 453 
experiences lack a lot of the dynamicity that characterizes sound. The “dynamicity” of 454 
smell is relatively slow and furthermore mostly involves a rise and fall in intensity, 455 
compared to the internal temporal variation of the quality of sounds. Moreover, taste 456 
and smell may be more consistently associated with entities. We think of a particular 457 
entity as having the property of a particular taste or smell, the same way we think of a 458 
particular entity as having the property of being rough or smooth. Such properties, in 459 
contrast to sound, are seen as characteristic of the object without any form of 460 
noticeable action or movement. In sum, we are arguing that adjectives such as 461 
sweet, stinky and rough are understood as properties of an entity, compared to 462 
words such as beeping and squealing, which are understood primarily as actions of 463 
an entity. 464 
The idea that sounds are more likely to be encoded via verbs as opposed to the 465 
other lexical categories has already been expressed by philosophers and linguists. 466 
For example, Pasnau (1999: 310) says that objects “do not have sounds, standardly, 467 
but instead make sounds. To squeak, squeal, wail, howl, quack — these are all ways 468 
of making a sound”. Krifka (2010) already observed (without quantitative evidence) 469 
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that in English, sounds are commonly expressed via verbs and if they are expressed 470 
via other lexical categories, these are often deverbal (as with the noun bang and the 471 
adjective banging). Cognitive linguists have furthermore observed that sound may 472 
participate in WHOLE EVENT STANDS FOR COPRESENT SUBEVENT metonymies, as when 473 
saying The car screeched to a halt (Günter Radden, personal communication), where 474 
within a whole motion event the sound is metonymically profiled. 475 
These observations by linguists and philosophers, in conjunction with our 476 
discussion of the phenomenology of sound, lead us to predict that verbs should be 477 
the favourite linguistic means to express sound and touch concepts. In what follows, 478 
we will provide a picture of the lexical category composition of English sensory 479 
lexicon that, among other things, will allow testing this hypothesis. As a final test and 480 
an additional dataset that substantiates the idea that sound concepts are very 481 
dynamic, we correlate movement and sound ratings for a large set of nouns from the 482 
Wisconsin perceptual attributes database (Medler et al., 2005). This dataset allows 483 
us directly assessing the question: are sound concepts more dynamic in the minds of 484 
English speakers? Altogether, our study not only addresses the question of whether 485 
the senses are lexicalized differently across lexical categories, but as far as we know, 486 
our study is the first to actually provide an empirical assessment of the idea that 487 
particular lexical categories have semantic preferences, in line with what cognitive 488 
and functional linguists have stated about the crucial involvement of time (Givón, 489 
2001; Langacker, 2008). 490 
 491 
3. Methods 492 
3.1. Datasets 493 
To investigate the distribution of sensory lexemes across lexical categories, we 494 
compared three different English datasets that include verbs, adjectives, and nouns. 495 
The datasets also provide information on the association of each lexeme with 496 
sensory modalities, which are in all three cases the five “classical” senses: sight, 497 
hearing, touch, taste, smell. Assuming five senses is non-trivial since it is 498 
philosophically unresolved how many distinct senses there are (see, for example, 499 
Macpherson, 2011; Casati et al., 2015), and since the senses are connected in highly 500 
complex ways (see, e.g., Spence & Piqueras-Fiszman, 2014). However, as a starting 501 
point it is useful to consider the five senses, which is also a way of categorizing the 502 
perceptual world that is adopted by the speakers of the language we look at, English 503 
(for discussion of five senses folk models in relation to methodological problems in 504 
sensory linguistics, see Winter, 2016b: Ch. 1). 505 
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Most work on sensory words has proceeded treating the problem of sensory 506 
modality classification as an easy one that can be solved in an intuitive fashion. For 507 
example, a lot of work on perception verbs, including Viberg (1983), Sweetser (1990) 508 
and San Roque et al. (2015), classified the verbs to see and to look at as visual, in 509 
contrast to the verb to smell and to taste, which would be classified as olfactory and 510 
gustatory respectively. In clear-cut cases such as these basic perception verbs, such 511 
a classification is straightforward. However, what about multisensory perception 512 
verbs such as to perceive (one can perceive a sound, a moving image but also a 513 
taste or smell)? Modality classifications are also difficult in the domain of adjectives, 514 
where there are some clear-cut unisensory adjectives such as purple (vision) and 515 
beeping (sound), but also many multisensory cases such as harsh (harsh sound, 516 
harsh taste, harsh smell) or magnitude or dimension terms such as large (Williams, 517 
1976; cf. discussion in Ronga et al., 2012), which describe properties that can be 518 
perceived through multiple sensory modalities, what Aristotle and others since then 519 
call “common sensibles”, percepts that are accessible to not just one but many 520 
senses (see Marks, 1978: Ch. 3). The problem of common sensibles is exacerbated 521 
when considering nouns, many of which can be perceived through all of the senses 522 
(see discussion in Lynott & Connell, 2013). For example, the concrete noun steak 523 
describes something that can be seen, felt, tasted, smelled and under the right 524 
conditions also heard. When doing quantitative comparisons across sensory 525 
modalities for many words, it is important to have some objective measure of sensory 526 
modality association. We need a defined set of words that has labels for sight, 527 
hearing, touch, taste and smell labels that have been assigned following clear 528 
criteria. Here, three such datasets will be considered. 529 
As we will discuss below, each word list is associated with its own set of 530 
problems. This is precisely why it is important to consult multiple datasets, to be able 531 
to show that whatever results we find is truly generalizable, no matter the particular 532 
design decisions that went into collecting each word list. In fact, there can be no 533 
perfect list that meets all desiderata; each dataset is more or less compliant with 534 
certain theoretical assumptions. Because of this, we need to adhere to the principle 535 
of converging evidence (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999: 79-80; Gries, Hampe, Schönefeld, 536 
2005), showing that a theoretical concept is supported by multiple sources and 537 
multiple different analyses. 538 
Dataset 1 is a combined set of modality ratings of 423 adjectives from Lynott and 539 
Connell (2009), 400 nouns from Lynott and Connell (2013) and 300 verbs from 540 
Winter (2016a). Combining the three studies (adjectives, nouns and verbs), the word 541 
list from the norm dataset includes 1,123 words. The three studies adopted the same 542 
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methodology: English native speakers were asked to rate whether a word 543 
corresponds to a particular sensory modality on a scale from 0 to 5. For example, 544 
speakers were asked to rate whether the property described by the adjective fragrant 545 
can be perceived through vision, hearing, touch, taste or smell, with five sliders 546 
embodying the relative “perceptual strength” of this property for the different sensory 547 
modalities. Following Lynott and Connell (2009), the maximum perceptual strength 548 
value can be taken to be a word’s “dominant modality”. For example, the adjective 549 
shiny received the highest mean rating for the visual modality, and it can hence be 550 
classified as a visual word. 551 
The sampling procedures involved in the three studies were slightly different. The 552 
adjectives from Lynott and Connell (2009) are a convenience sample selected based 553 
on prior research (in particular, experimental studies that investigated sensory words) 554 
and based on synonyms and lexical field information gleaned from thesaurus lists. 555 
The noun list from Lynott and Connell (2013) is a random sample. The verbs from 556 
Winter (2016a) were comprised of two sets: one sample that was selected based on 557 
synonyms with basic perception verbs gleaned from the literature, particularly, Viberg 558 
(1983). And another sample that was selected randomly from words above median 559 
frequency in the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007). Although it would be 560 
desirable to have random samples for all three datasets, the results obtained in 561 
Winter (2016a) and Winter (2016b), for example, do not hinge on whether the 562 
random or the non-random subset of the verb is used—suggesting that to some 563 
extent the sampling procedure is not a big issue in this particular case. Moreover, in 564 
all of the three different studies the lists were not chosen with respect to the particular 565 
research question investigated in this paper, and the methods were principled (e.g., 566 
dictionary searches), suggesting that the potential role of bias in the sampling 567 
procedure specifically with respect to our research hypotheses is small. Moreover, 568 
precisely because of concerns about the sampling procedure in these three studies it 569 
is useful to show that we obtain qualitatively similar results for two other lists of 570 
sensory words.  571 
Dataset 2 is a word list of sensory lexemes collected by Strik Lievers (2015). This 572 
list was collected starting from a short list of core sensory lexemes, which was 573 
expanded in successive phases using various lexical resources and dictionaries. For 574 
instance, the noun list was enriched by searching for the direct objects that display 575 
stronger association with the perception verbs already in the list, based on corpus 576 
data; adjectives were retrieved among the modifiers of perception nouns; synonyms 577 
and hyponyms were obtained for all lexemes. At each step the list was manually 578 
checked (see Strik Lievers, 2015: 76-78 and Strik Lievers & Huang, 2016 for details). 579 
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The dataset was created to retrieve instances of synesthetic metaphors from corpus 580 
data. The list was subsequently extended to include a total of 512 words (Strik 581 
Lievers & Huang, 2016), from which all nouns of musical instruments (trumpet, piano, 582 
etc.) were excluded (these were previously classified as auditory). The total dataset 583 
of words without instruments comprises 486 words. 584 
Dataset 3 is the Sensicon (Tekiroğlu et al., 2014), a resource which includes 585 
22,684 lexemes together with their degree of association with the five senses. A 586 
second list has subsequently been published by the same authors (Tekiroğlu et al., 587 
2015), however, this list does not include verbs and thus cannot be used to address 588 
the present research hypotheses. The Sensicon dataset we use here was 589 
constructed by looking at word co-occurrence statistics in the GigaWord corpus. The 590 
idea here is that if a given word occurs very frequently together in the same text with 591 
a particular seed word of a given sensory modality, then it is a word of this sensory 592 
modality (for problems with this assumption, see Louwerse & Connell, 2011, Winter, 593 
2016b, and Tekiroğlu et al., 2015). The structure of the dataset is similar to the 594 
ratings represented in Lynott and Connell (2009, 2013) and Winter (2016a), with a 595 
continuous numerical value for each modality association. Because the classification 596 
in Strik Lievers (2015) is discrete (a word is either of a given sensory modality or not) 597 
and because the sensory modality ratings by Lynott and Connell (2009, 2013) and 598 
Winter (2016a, 2016b) have been used in a discrete fashion, which facilitates 599 
computations of lexical differentiation, we will also treat the Sensicon ratings in a 600 
discrete fashion, selecting a word’s highest numerical value as that word’s dominant 601 
sensory modality. 602 
As mentioned before, the classifications in each dataset are not entirely 603 
unproblematic, and there is considerable noise associated with some of the datasets. 604 
For example, Strik Lievers (2015) did not consider ticklish, painful and tingly as touch 605 
words, but they are counted as touch words in the Lynott and Connell (2009) dataset 606 
because the highest ratings of these words were for the tactile modality. Many of the 607 
nouns in the Lynott and Connell (2013) dataset are highly abstract (e.g., heaven, 608 
fact) and not at all strongly related to sensory perception, compared to the Strik 609 
Lievers (2015) nouns, which more directly relate to perception (e.g., glare, rustle, 610 
gleam, shadow, tune). Lynott and Connell (2013) discuss the abstractness of many 611 
of the nouns involved, which is a natural outgrowth of the fact that these words were 612 
randomly sampled. In particular, in their dataset many abstract nouns were rated to 613 
be highest in auditory content (such as account, blame), presumably because 614 
participants thought that they were mediated through language and speech, and thus 615 
sound-related in some way. Similarly, because they are based on text co-616 
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occurrences, it is not at all clear in many cases what the modality associations for the 617 
Sensicon mean, with many examples that just seem “off”, such as inspector being 618 
classified as auditory, and fraction as olfactory. 619 
 620 
3.2. Analysis approach 621 
How should we cope with the fact that we are dealing both with proper perception 622 
concepts, that is words that can adequately be called “sound words”, “touch words” 623 
etc., as well as perception-related concepts, and ultimately words that are so highly 624 
abstract (e.g., heaven) or multimodal (e.g., seem) that classifying them according to 625 
sensory perceptions makes no sense? Luckily, there are multiple ways of dealing 626 
with this problem. For the norm dataset and the Sensicon, we can use the continuous 627 
measures of modality associations to get a “cleaner” dataset of words that are more 628 
strongly related to actual perception. First, Lynott and Connell (2009) compute a 629 
measure of “modality exclusivity”, ranging from 0% (all five senses the same) to 630 
100% (no overlap in ratings for the five senses). For example, the adjective blue had 631 
a modality exclusivity of 80%, indicating that it was highly visual in a unisensory 632 
fashion. The adjective strange on the other hand had a modality exclusivity of 9.6%, 633 
indicating that it does not relate very strongly to any particular sense. In one of our 634 
analyses, we included only words that were above the 70th percentile on this 635 
modality exclusivity measure; that is, we excluded highly multimodal words. As a 636 
second exclusion criterion, we considered overall perceptual strength, that is, the 637 
sum of the five modality ratings (see also Connell & Lynott, 2012). For example, the 638 
highly non-sensory words republic (+2.79), remark (+2.9) and corrupt (+3.33) had 639 
very low perceptual strength ratings overall, compared to the much more sensory 640 
words silky (+9.29), short (+9.04) and bitter (+8.95). We ran an additional set of 641 
analyses with only those words that were above the 70th percentile in the overall 642 
perceptual strength measure. These two exclusion criteria can be applied to both the 643 
modality norm datasets, as well as to the Sensicon, because both have continuous 644 
perceptual strength measures. As a third exclusion criterion, one of the authors (Strik 645 
Lievers) marked words in the norm dataset as questionable with respect to whether 646 
they had any sensory qualities at all. We have in front of us what Gelman and Loken 647 
(2013) call the “garden of forking paths” when performing a statistical analysis, which 648 
is potentially dangerous because it invites researcher degrees of freedom (Simmons 649 
et al., 2011). Rather than ignoring these potentially problematic analysis decisions, 650 
we make them an integral part of our analysis. The R script (using R version 3.3.1, R 651 
Core Team, 2015) that we make available with this publication has several “switches” 652 
for running the analysis with (1) only the 30% most unimodal words, (2) only the 30% 653 
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words with the highest perceptual strength and (3) only those words that were not 654 
flagged as questionable. As a fourth and final “switch” in the analysis, we can 655 
consider lexical category counts only for those words that are above median 656 
frequency in SUBTLEX, the Subtitle Corpus of American English (Brysbaert & New, 657 
2009). The main findings we report below, the “verbiness” of sound concepts, can be 658 
found in all three datasets under all combinations of these “analysis switches”. 659 
We thus assess the sensitivity of our findings with respect to several analysis 660 
decisions, finding that the main result holds. Moreover, as is clear from the brief 661 
descriptions above, the three datasets have been built independently from each 662 
other, for different research purposes and with different methods. Rather than being 663 
a problem, this is an advantage—to the extent that we show results that hold across 664 
these three different datasets, these results are supported by converging evidence 665 
and are thus more generalizable. If the datasets were all constructed using the same 666 
sampling criteria or the same approach to sensory classification, our results would be 667 
less convincing because they may be subject to these particular methodological 668 
decisions. By using three different datasets, we circumvent this concern. 669 
Below, we report analyses for all three datasets, for convenience sake only 670 
showing the results for (1) the highly unimodal ones (70th percentile exclusivity), (2) 671 
all words regardless of perceptual strength (no exclusion), (3) all frequencies (no 672 
exclusion) and (4) without the words that were flagged as questionable. While the 673 
results, of course, differ in terms of the precise numerical values if different exclusion 674 
criteria are used, the substantive conclusions do not change. 675 
As a final methodological decision, we need to talk about how lexical category 676 
assignments have been dealt with. Each of the three word lists comes with its own 677 
set of lexical category labels. The main result can be established with the existing 678 
category labels that come with each dataset; however, there are several problems. 679 
Consider the word squealing, which is part of the Lynott and Connell (2009) adjective 680 
ratings, but could also be labeled as verb based on its morphology (the suffix –ing). 681 
However, morphology is not a good criterion in all cases (and we would need to take 682 
productivity of affixes into account), and moreover it does not help in cases of zero 683 
derivation (e.g., blue can be used as adjective and noun). To deal with such 684 
decisions in a principled manner, we used corpus-based lexical category 685 
classifications from Brysbaert et al. (2012). These researchers used an automatic 686 
tagger on the SUBTLEX subtitle corpus to determine whether a word was used as a 687 
noun, verb or adjective. For example, the word form squealing occurs 97 times in 688 
SUBTLEX as a verb and only 5 times as an adjective. We used the corpus-based 689 
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tags from Brysbaert et al. (2012), only including those words that occurred 70% in 690 
their primary lexical category. 691 
We should note that in using corpus-based part-of-speech tags, we are explicitly 692 
assuming that nouns/verbs/adjectives are distributionally defined, and we then look 693 
for semantic differences across these distributionally defined categories (cf. Baker & 694 
Croft, 2017: 183), in this case in terms of perceptual meaning. Thus, we are 695 
essentially testing semantics within a predefined set of lexicogrammatical 696 
differences. 697 
The scripts are accessible together with the data under the following publically 698 
accessible repository2: 699 
 700 
[ omitted because of requirement to be anonymous ] 701 
 702 
4. Results 703 
4.1. Lexical category counts 704 
We start out by considering the differentiation of lexical categories across the five 705 
sensory modalities, essentially just performing a type count, i.e., how many unique 706 
words are there per sensory modality per lexical category. We cannot, however, 707 
simply count up sight words, sound words, touch words, etc. per lexical category etc. 708 
This is because in each dataset, there is a different baseline number of lexical 709 
categories: the modality ratings have 36% nouns, 38% adjectives and 27% verbs; 710 
Sensicon has 51% nouns, 31% adjectives and 17% verbs; the Strik Lievers (2015) 711 
dataset has 40% nouns, 36% adjectives and 24% verbs (before any of the exclusion 712 
criteria are applied). This means that we have to take into account that there are less 713 
verbs overall. In addition, we have to take into account that certain sensory 714 
modalities have more or less word types associated with them, regardless of lexical 715 
category. For example, the datasets exhibit show some form of visual bias (see 716 
Levinson & Majid, 2014; Strik Lievers, 2015; Winter, 2016b): in the modality ratings, 717 
there are 57% visual words (followed by 16% auditory, 16% touch, 7% taste, 4% 718 
smell). In the Sensicon, there are 27% visual words (followed by 26% taste, 19% 719 
touch, 18% sound, 10% smell). In the Strik Lievers (2015) dataset, there are 45% 720 
sound words (followed by 29% sight, 10% touch, 9% taste, 6% smell). The tables in 721 
Appendix A list the counts per sense and per lexical category for all three datasets 722 
(no exclusions). 723 
                                                
2 All analyses were conducted with the packages “tidyverse” version 1.1.1 (Wickham, 2017), “stringr” 
version 1.1.0 (Wickham, 2016) and “png” version 0.1-7 (Urbanek, 2013). We use the following sense 
logos from FreePik: http://www.freepik.com/free-vector/five-senses-icons_837465.htm 
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Thus, in terms of raw word type counts per sensory modality, there are stark 724 
differences between the three datasets, but also some clear similarities. First of all, 725 
vision is ranked first in two out of three cases, supporting the idea that the English 726 
lexicon exhibits “visual dominance” (Buck, 1949; Viberg, 1983; Levinson & Majid, 727 
2014; Winter, 2016b: Ch. 3). That is, the English language appears to make more 728 
distinctions in the visual modality than in any other sensory modality. A second result 729 
that is consistent across all three datasets is that smell is always ranked last, 730 
vindicating the view that at least in English, there are very few words for smells 731 
(Buck, 1949; Viberg, 1983; Levinson & Majid, 2014; Winter, 2016b: Ch. 3) and the 732 
more general idea that smell is a “muted sense” (Yeshurun & Sobel, 2010; Olofsson 733 
& Gottfried, 2015). With the exception of the Sensicon, where taste ranks very highly, 734 
vision, touch, and sound appear to rank together as having high word counts, 735 
followed by taste and smell. 736 
If we now want to look at whether particular lexical categories are over- or under-737 
represented for a particular sense, we need to keep these asymmetries between the 738 
senses in mind, together with any asymmetries between overall lexical category 739 
counts. To do this in a principled manner, we use Chi-Square tests and standardized 740 
Pearson residuals. The Chi-Square test computes the expected counts for each cell, 741 
based on a simple multiplication of the row total (how many words per lexical 742 
category) and the column total (how many words per sensory modality). 743 
Standardized Pearson residuals then give a standardized measure of how much 744 
each unique cell in a cross-tabulation deviates from expected counts. 745 
In the following, we will report data based on the “cleaned” set with the exclusion 746 
criteria stated above (70th percentile unimodal, excluding questionable cases). In the 747 
case of the modality norm datasets (with N = 196 after exclusion), a Chi-Square test 748 
yields a significant result (χ2 = 43.25, bootstrapped p-value based on 2,000 samples 749 
p = 0.00005). This provides a formal test of the idea that indeed, lexical categories 750 
are not distributed evenly across the five senses. Figure 1 displays the standardized 751 
residuals, with values larger than 2 or smaller than -2 being indicative of contributing 752 
to a significant Chi-Square value (see Levshina, 2015: 220-221; Agresti, 2001). As 753 
can be seen, based on this >|2| cut-off rule, verbs are over-represented particularly 754 
for sound and touch. They are significantly under-represented for vision, which has 755 
comparatively more nouns and adjectives than what is expected based on chance. In 756 
the modality norm dataset, touch has significantly less adjectives, and sound has 757 
significantly less nouns. 758 
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 759 
Figure 1: Standardized Pearson residuals for the three lexical categories per sensory modality; based 760 
on data from Lynott & Connell (2009, 2013) and Winter (2016a) 761 
 762 
Besides this result that looks across lexical categories, it should be noted that 763 
even only within the list of adjectives by Lynott and Connell (2009), there is a clear 764 
verb bias: of the 68 properties, 42 (62%) turned out to be more frequently used as 765 
verbs when the corpus-based part-of-speech tags from Brysbaert et al. (2012) were 766 
used. Not only does hearing have many more verbs than nouns or adjectives, but 767 
also many of those words that are treated as auditory adjectives in the 768 
psycholinguistic literature that is based on the Lynott and Connell (2009) ratings are 769 
actually deverbal. Semantically, this means that many auditory adjectives (such as 770 
squealing) are not prototypical property-describing adjectives: they rather describe 771 
actions, thus contributing to increase the semantic “verbiness” of the auditory lexicon.  772 
For the Strik Lievers (2015) dataset, there were 254 unique words left after 773 
exclusion. Again, lexical categories were distributed unevenly across the five senses 774 
(χ2 = 38.0, p = 0.0005). A look at the Pearson residuals in Figure 2 reveals that there 775 
are many differences with respect to the previous dataset with respect to which 776 
lexical categories are over- or under-represented for which sensory modalities. In 777 
particular, whereas adjectives were significantly under-represented in the norm 778 
dataset for touch, they are significantly over-represented for touch in the Strik Lievers 779 
(2015) dataset. Touch also has significantly less nouns and verbs in this dataset. 780 
Taste has significantly more adjectives. For sound, there were significantly more 781 
nouns and significantly less adjectives. Crucially, despite all these discrepancies to 782 
the previous dataset, verbs are still over-represented for sound. 783 
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 784 
Figure 2: Standardized Pearson residuals for the three lexical categories per sensory modality; based 785 
on data from Strik Lievers (2015) 786 
 787 
Finally, what about the Sensicon (N = 4,405 after exclusion)? Again, lexical 788 
categories were unevenly distributed across the five senses (χ2 = 102.9, p = 0.0005). 789 
A look at the Pearson residuals in Figure 3 reveals that adjectives were significantly 790 
over-represented for smell and sight, and under-represented for touch and sound. 791 
Nouns were significantly under-represented for sight. Finally, verbs were significantly 792 
over-represented for touch, under-represented for sight, and crucially, over-793 
represented for sound. 794 
 795 
Figure 3: Standardized Pearson residuals for the three lexical categories per sensory modality; based 796 
on data from the Sensicon (Tekiroğlu et al., 2014) 797 
 798 
To look at all datasets together, we average the standardized residuals for each 799 
cell across the ratings, the Strik Lievers (2015) word list and the Sensicon. This 800 
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revealed that verbs were over-represented for sound (+3.5) and adjectives were 801 
under-represented (-3.5). On top of that, adjectives were over-represented for sight 802 
(+3.3) and verbs were under-represented for sight (-3.0). No other Pearson residuals 803 
crossed the threshold of |2|. The over-representation of adjectives for sight, 804 
compared to the under-represented for sound, is noteworthy. Sound and sight are 805 
traditionally regarded as being on top of a “hierarchy” of the senses (e.g., Ullmann, 806 
1959 [1957]), yet the auditory modality has less words that describe dedicated 807 
perceptual characteristics in an adjectival fashion. 808 
 809 
4.2. Wisconsin perceptual attribute ratings 810 
We now move away from considerations of lexical category differences and provide 811 
one piece of data that lends additional support for the dynamic nature of sound 812 
concepts that stems from an independent dataset and a different approach. The 813 
dataset we consider here, the Wisconsin perceptual attributes database, is a set of 814 
1,402 words that have been rated for how much they make reference to particular 815 
domains of sensorymotor experience (the description of the ratings does not discuss 816 
what criteria were used to sample the word list). 342 undergraduate students rated 817 
different semantic dimensions on a scale from 0 (concept not at all important for this 818 
dimension) to +6 (very important). Crucially, there are three semantic dimensions in 819 
this dataset relevant to our idea of the dynamicity of sound, namely: sound ratings, 820 
motion ratings and, for comparison, color ratings. The words that received the 821 
highest sound ratings were explosion, siren, scream, bomb, fireworks, dynamite, 822 
rocket, gunshot, thunder and alarm. The words with the lowest sound ratings were 823 
palm, prune, velvet, broccoli, oblique, sum, yam, mushroom, corpse and number. 824 
The words that received the highest color ratings were orange, bluejay, blueberry, 825 
flamingo, rose, tomato, pumpkin, cherry, sun, and autumn. The words that received 826 
the lowest color ratings were actuality, heresy, interim, lecture, remedy, reprisal, 827 
agility, analogy, aye, and bequest. Finally, the words with the highest motion ratings 828 
were rocket, tornado, cheetah, hurricane, jet, avalanche, stampede, sex, jaguar, and 829 
children. The words with the lowest motion ratings were asphalt, basement, box, 830 
bread, brick, cabin, cave, ceiling, cliff and corn. Given the idea that sound is more 831 
dynamic, we would expect a higher correlation between sound and motion ratings 832 
than between motion and color ratings. Here, we operationalize dynamicity with 833 
respect to motion ratings alone (as outlined above, the concept of dynamicity in the 834 
domain of sound is wider than just the involvement of movement). 835 
Pairwise correlations, depicted in Figure 4, show that sound ratings are reliably 836 
correlated with motion ratings (t(1400) = 27.28, p < 0.0001), with a relatively high 837 
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correlation coefficient, Pearson’s r = 0.59 (R2 = 0.35). There also was a reliable 838 
correlation with color ratings (t(1400) = 8.03, p < 0.0001), but a much smaller one 839 
with r = 0.21 (R2 = 0.04). A simple linear regression model where both sound and 840 
color ratings are used to predict motion ratings with an interaction for type of rating 841 
(color versus sound) shows that the slope for sound and motion is reliably stronger 842 
than the slope for color and motion (estimate: 0.32, SE = 0.03, t = 11.06, p < 0.001). 843 
 844 
 845 
Figure 4: Correlation between sound/color ratings with motion ratings; superimposed 846 
fit of a simple linear regression with 95% confidence region 847 
 848 
These results provide independent evidence for the idea that sound-related 849 
concepts tend to also be motion-related concepts. These ratings were performed on 850 
words from one lexical category alone (nouns), but even within that lexical category, 851 
there is evidence for sound-related concepts being thought of as relatively more 852 
dynamic, at least when compared to color-related concepts. Given the limits of the 853 
Wisconsin ratings (which did not include ratings for the other sensory modalities), 854 
here, only comparisons between sound and color were possible, for which sound 855 
emerged as more motion-related than color. However, this evidence corroborates 856 
what we found for the sound-verb association when looking at lexical category 857 
differences across the senses, except that in this case, participants directly rated the 858 
meaning of the words involved with respect to motion, sound and color. 859 
 860 
5. Discussion 861 
The comparative analysis of four datasets, each collected independently, showed 862 
that the composition of the English sensory lexicon is not uniform across sensory 863 
modalities, and that sound-related concepts are associated with dynamicity. For the 864 
lexical category results, we showed that regardless of which dataset was consulted, 865 
and even though the datasets differed quite starkly with respect to the ranking of the 866 
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other senses, verbs were always over-represented in the domain of sound. We 867 
furthermore found corroborating evidence for the idea of visual dominance, as well as 868 
for the idea that smell is lexically impoverished in English. As concerns the overall 869 
number of words per sensory modality, vision ranks first in two out of three datasets 870 
(followed by hearing and touch, and in the case of the Sensicon, followed by taste). 871 
Smell consistently ranked last. This provides quantitative confirmation of the common 872 
depiction of vision as the dominant sense and olfaction as a “muted” sense in the 873 
English lexicon (cf. Levinson & Majid, 2014). Second, as concerns the distribution of 874 
lexical categories across the senses, the analysis showed that verbs are 875 
overrepresented for hearing. This was the case for all three different datasets. In two 876 
out of three datasets, we also found that verbs were over-represented for touch. 877 
The unequal distribution of lexical categories across sensory modalities turned out 878 
to be consistent on the one hand with the semantic properties of prototypical 879 
members of the relevant lexical category, and on the other hand with the properties 880 
of each of the five senses in actual perception, as indicated by our review of the 881 
literature of the phenomenology of auditory perception. In particular, the results of our 882 
analysis confirmed the hypothesis that, given that prototypical verbs describe actions, 883 
events and processes, and given that sound and (to a minor extent) touch are highly 884 
dynamic sensory modalities, verbs are particularly fit to express auditory and tactile 885 
experiences. The connection between hearing and verbs seems to be stronger than 886 
the connection between the other senses and the verbal domain. 887 
It should be noted that all of these patterns are probabilistic. There clearly are 888 
verbs associated with each sensory modality (e.g., the basic perception verbs to see, 889 
to hear, to feel, to smell, to taste), and there are also adjectives associated with each 890 
sensory modality (e.g., purple, loud, rough, musky, bitter), and also nouns (e.g., 891 
image, melody, contact, odor, flavor). The patterns we discuss here are not all-or-892 
nothing, but they are about the relative degree to which particular senses tend to 893 
associate with particular lexical categories. 894 
The patterns we found here fit with existing literature on language and the senses 895 
in cognitive linguistics, or functional-cognitive linguistics more generally. Huumo 896 
(2010) provided independent evidence for sound being more dynamic in his analysis 897 
of which locative markers go together with which perception verbs in Finnish. He 898 
observed that active perception verbs tend to have directional case markers (‘from’ or 899 
‘to’), and this also characterized sound verbs (and smell verbs), but not visual verbs, 900 
which tended to go with more “static” case markers (‘in’, ‘on’, ‘at’). Similarly, the 901 
dynamicity of touch has been noted by Popova (2005), although her analysis focused 902 
not on verbs but on the gradability in adjectives. Popova (2005: 400) described touch 903 
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as an “active sense”, stating that “the most common mode of touch is the active 904 
movement of the hand”. She furthermore cites Katz (1989 [1925]: 242) who said that 905 
“[t]ouching means to bring to life a particular class of physical properties through our 906 
own activity.” These arguments are in line with our finding that touch, although not as 907 
much as sound, latches onto the verbal domain relatively more strongly. Finally, 908 
Winter, Perlman, Perry and Lupyan (2017) argue that the dynamicity of both touch 909 
and sound as sensory modalities may explain why both sound and touch words in 910 
English are so highly “onomatopoetic” in character, since vocal iconicity may be 911 
particularly effective if a dynamic medium (sound and touch) is expressed in another 912 
dynamic medium (speech) (see also Winter, 2016b: Ch. 6). 913 
The distribution of lexical categories with respect to the senses is also relevant for 914 
studies of synesthetic metaphors. Ullmann (1959 [1957]) already remarked that 915 
asymmetries in the vocabularies of languages could lead to asymmetries in 916 
metaphors, i.e., senses that have less lexical material associated with them need to 917 
“borrow” more words from the other senses, an argument that was extended by Strik 918 
Lievers (2015) to be specifically about lexical categories. Our results provide further 919 
evidence for this claim. In particular, they may contribute to account for the fact that 920 
in the literature on synesthetic metaphors sound — rather than the “dominant” 921 
modality of sight — consistently emerges as the ultimate target domain of cross-922 
sensory mappings, often with sight as the source sensory modality (Ullmann, 1959 923 
[1957]; Williams, 1976; Day, 1996; Shen, 1997; Strik Lievers, 2015; Winter, 2016b). 924 
The three datasets show that adjectives are under-represented for sound, while they 925 
are over-represented for sight. Taking into consideration that the dominant pattern 926 
investigated in the literature on synaesthesia are adjective-noun combinations, the 927 
adjective being the source and the noun the target domain, it is therefore not 928 
surprising that, between sight and sound, it is sight that is more commonly found as a 929 
source. Given this, some asymmetries observed in cross-sensory mappings may 930 
correlate with lexical category differences (as suggested by Strik Lievers, 2015; other 931 
factors have to be taken into account as well, see Winter, 2016b: Ch. 8). Either way, 932 
our results suggest that when people perform metaphor counts, they should take into 933 
account what an appropriate “baseline” for comparison is and what specific 934 
affordances are created by the lexicon. 935 
What do our results say about research on lexical categories? As stated by Baker 936 
and Croft (2017: 181), “Prior to the advent of structuralist notions of categories, the 937 
widespread view was that lexical categories were defined notionally, by something 938 
like the idea that nouns express things, verbs express actions, and adjectives 939 
express properties.” We do not say that we have to go back to a fully notional view of 940 
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lexical categories, especially since morphological and distributional criteria 941 
(especially if amended by other criteria, see Farmer et al., 2006) work so well within 942 
language. However, we should point out that besides the introspective analyses in 943 
works such as Givón (1979), Givón (2001 [1984]) and Langacker (2008), there was, 944 
so far, little quantitative evidence for systematic semantic differences between 945 
different lexical categories. The idea that lexical categories defined by their 946 
grammatical properties differ in meaning has so far been a claim that only rested on 947 
intuitions; here, we tested this general idea using the specialized vocabulary of 948 
sensory language. Of course, sensory meaning does not exhaust semantics; it is 949 
only a narrow subpart of it. Nevertheless, in this case, sensory meaning proved to be 950 
a useful access point for investigating semantic differences between lexical 951 
categories. We hope that further studies of lexical categories will incorporate similar 952 
methodologies, such as the use of human rating studies such as Lynott and Connell 953 
(2009) to quantify the semantic intuitions and the claims that have been put forth in 954 
cognitive linguistics. 955 
As reviewed above, already Aristotle viewed nouns as having “no reference to 956 
time” and sounds as not being able to occur without movement. In this paper, we 957 
connect these two claims. We should note, however, that whereas Aristotle thought 958 
of this in terms of actual ontologies, here we are talking more about 959 
conceptualization. Baker and Croft (2017: 118) state that “The semantic contrast in 960 
the linguistic expressions, including the lexical category that is used, reflects that 961 
conceptualization, not the “objective” properties of the entities being described.” 962 
However, the way sound is produced “objectively” in the world, namely through a 963 
dynamic event, fosters a consistent phenomenology of sound as a time-varying and 964 
motion-related quality. This conceptualization, in turn, may drive how sound is 965 
encoded in the lexicon, such as the present evidence from English showed. All 966 
senses involve motion and action to some extent, but in the case of sound this is 967 
phenomenologically more apparent to the language users, which hence may drive 968 
particular forms of linguistic encoding. 969 
Finally, we hope to have shown on the methodological side that many interesting 970 
questions can be asked, and answered, by using already existing datasets. In our 971 
case, we used humanly generated property ratings (Lynott & Connell, 2009), noun 972 
ratings (Lynott & Connell, 2013), verb ratings (Winter, 2016a), sound and motion 973 
ratings (Medler et al., 2005), a manually annotated lexicon (Strik Lievers, 2015) and 974 
the automatically generated Sensicon (Tekiroğlu et al., 2014) to address questions 975 
about language and perception, as well as about the semantics of lexical categories 976 
more generally. While there was a lot of noise in the used data sources, applying the 977 
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principle of converging evidence (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999: 79-80; Gries, Hampe, 978 
Schönefeld, 2005) through the incorporation of multiple data sources allowed us to 979 
draw confident conclusions. 980 
To conclude: not all senses are created equal. While the senses may be 981 
differentially encoded in general (Levinson & Majid, 2014), the present data 982 
demonstrated that the senses may also be differentially encoded with respect to 983 
lexical categories in particular. The senses latch onto particular domains of 984 
experience, and depending on what type of experiences are preferentially expressed 985 
through certain lexical categories, such as verbs being more dynamic, this creates 986 
asymmetries in how perception is encoded in language. 987 
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Appendix A: Raw counts from the three word lists 1234 
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  Sight Sound Touch Taste Smell N 
Norms Adj 205 68 70 54 26 423 
Noun 336 42 14 6 2 400 
Verb 102 71 101 13 13 300 
  643 181 185 73 41  
        
Author 1 
(2015) 
Adj 73 30 36 27 9 175 
Noun 49 107 8 14 15 193 
Verb 21 82 5 4 6 118 
  143 219 49 45 30  
        
Sensicon Adj 2074 1147 1121 1804 573 6719 
Noun 3005 2069 2186 2732 1091 11083 
Verb 800 761 764 961 452 3738 
  5879 3977 4071 5497 2116  
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